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GRAY MARKET GOODS: A LIGHTER
SHADE OF BLACK
Hugh C. Hansen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If a street vendor offers a famous brand-name product for a
substantially lower price than one would expect, the average
consumer's initial reaction might be that the product had been
stolen or was "hot" - a product of the black market. While
such discounted goods might indeed be stolen, sophisticated
consumers have come to expect similar discounts in stores and

mail-order houses throughout the country on goods not from the
black market but rather from the "gray market."1 These products, naturally enough, are called "gray market goods" or simply

"gray goods."

Gray goods are brand-name products manufactured abroad

which bear an authentic trademark authorized by the owner of
the trademark in the market for which the goods are intended.

The owner of the trademark is usually foreign. These goods are
normally intended for markets outside the United States at the
time of manufacture.2 At some point, however, the gray goods
are "diverted" or imported into the United States for the purpose of competing with the U.S. trademark owner's authorized

goods.'
Historically, the importation of gray goods was rare and
sporadic. As a consequence, the U.S. Customs Service's regula* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. "Gray" is used because while the sale of these goods is not clearly illegal, it is not
clearly legal either. See infra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text. Of course, "grey" may
also be used.
2. Occasionally, the goods are manufactured for a U.S. trademark owner who rejects
them. The manufacturer then sells them to importers who distribute the goods in the
United States. See El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe World Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d
Cir. 1986).
3. When the U.S. trademark owner imports the products, the goods are also known
as "parallel imports." Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). This term has been used incorrectly as a synonym for gray goods. See Brief for Petitioner K-Mart Corp. at (i), 4, K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., Nos. 86-495, 86-624, & 86-625. (U.S. Sup. Ct. Feb. 21, 1987) [hereinafter KMart Brief]; cf. Tyson & Parker, ParallelImportation of Copyrighted Phonorecords,10
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 397, 397-98 (1985); Note, ParallelImporting Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 113, 114-115 (1984).
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tions4 which permit their importation were ignored. Gray goods,
as a legal topic, were confined to the backwaters of antitrust and
intellectual property law. In the last few years, however, the importation of gray goods has become a growth industry and has
generated numerous lawsuits5 and commentaries.'
While the initial growth in the gray market was spurred by
the very high value of the U.S. dollar in international currency
markets, it appears that now a permanent gray market network
has developed that will make the subject of gray-goods importation one of importance for years to come regardless of the value
of the dollar.7
4. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (1987).
5. Three actions alone have been filed attacking the Customs Service regulations.
See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), petitionfor cert. filed,
55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 86-757) (Nov. 6, 1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub
nom., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 107 S.Ct. 642 (1986) [hereinafter COPIAT]; Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 791
(1986).
6. Writing about gray goods is, itself, a growth industry. One of the best commentaries on the subject is by a student author. See Note, The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulations
19 C.F.R. § 133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (1985) [hereinafter Greying of American
Trademarks]. The note takes a strong stand against gray goods (which coincides with
this author's views). Its influence has been such that one supporter of gray goods felt
compelled to attack it in its Supreme Court brief as being "one-sided." See Brief for
Petitioner 47th Street Photo, Inc. at 46, K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., Nos. 86-495, 86624 & 86-625 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1986) [hereinafter 47th Street Photo Brief]. To
show that the Fordham Law School community is not "one-sided," there is a student
note that takes an equally strong stand in support of gray goods. See Note, Grey Market
Goods and Modern International Commerce: A Question of Free Trade, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 308 (1987).
7. One indication of this is the formation by U.S. trademark owners of an organization, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, or COPIAT, to oppose
the importation of gray goods in legislative, administrative and judicial forums. See
Eisler, Gray-Market Mayhem: Its Makers v. Importers in Lobbying Onslaught, IX Legal
Times, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Riley, "Gray Market" Fight Isn't Black and White,
THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.

Another indication of the staying power of the gray market is the vigorous defense
of gray goods by two retailers who sell a significant amount of such goods, 47th Street
Photo Inc. and K-Mart Corporation. 47th Street Photo is a New York retailer which also
has a nationwide mail order business. K-Mart operates more than 2,000 "discount department stores" throughout the country and is said to purchase between $250 and $350
million of gray goods annually. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 916
n.1. (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55
U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1986) (No. 86-757). Both companies have intervened in the
three actions attacking the Customs Service's regulations and are active litigants in the
current Supreme Court case, K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc. See K-Mart Brief, supra note
3; 47th Street Photo Brief, supra note 6.
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Overview of Gray Goods Debate

Both those in favor of and those against gray goods claim to
be acting in the interest of consumers. Supporters of gray goods
claim that the importation of gray goods frustrates the efforts of
multinational firms to price discriminate against U.S. consumers. If such firms seek to charge consumers in the United States
a higher price than those in other countries, they argue that
gray-market importation or "arbitrage" should be allowed, i.e.,
the transfer of the products by unrelated third parties from the
foreign country to the United States where they can be sold at
prices below those charged by dealers authorized to sell the
goods by U.S. trademark owners. Thus, they say, the gray market causes greater availability of the trademarked product and
lower prices to U.S. consumers.
Opponents of the gray market dispute the claim that the
United States trademark owners are engaging in price discrimination or the price-gouging of U.S. consumers. They claim that
the only reason gray goods can be priced lower is that the importers are "free riding" on the efforts of the U.S. trademark
owners which have to pay for advertisements to create and sustain the market as well as pre-sales service and post-sale warranties." These costs, they say, can amount to 27% of the retail
price. Gray marketeers have none of these costs. U.S. trademark
owners also argue that vigorous competition among the brandname, trademarked products precludes price gouging which is
not possible unless the seller has a monopoly or at least a very
substantial market share. These conditions, they say, do not exist for these products.
Thus, the U.S. trademark owners argue that the gray mar8. Opponents of gray goods also deny that gray goods are necessarily priced lower
than authorized goods. Many gray goods, they say, are priced the same or higher. See
Gray Market Imports: Hearings on § 2614 Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-70 (1986) (statement of
Robert Miller, President and Chief Executive Officer, Ritz Group Ltd.) My conversations
with attorneys for gray-goods retailers confirm that availability is sometimes more important than the lower wholesale prices. Gray goods, for some retailers, are simply a way
to sell a trademarked product that the U.S. trademark owner will not authorize them to
sell. K-Mart, for instance, claims that "many trademark owners refuse to sell directly to

price-competitive retailers including K-Mart." K-Mart Corp. Brief, supra note 3, at 6.
U.S. trademark owners on the other hand, want control over who sells their products for
a number of reasons including their belief that sales outside the authorized distribution

chain result in lost prestige, which impairs the trademark's good will and diffuses the
U.S. trademark owner's promotional efforts. See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 850; Greying
of American Trademarks, supra note 6, at 85 n.7.
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ket is not indicative of price gouging but exists simply because
the cost of transporting goods to the United States is less than
the advertising and assorted costs of the U.S. trademark owner.
The gray market will normally exist, therefore, for goods whose
retail price is relatively high in relation to their weight and for

which there is substantial brand-name advertising. Goods in this
category include cameras, binoculars, watches, perfumes and
cosmetics, and electronic goods.
The U.S. trademark owners oppose the gray market for a
second reason. They say that gray goods deceive or confuse consumers about the source of trademarked products, and, therefore, about the quality of the product itself or the availability of
warranties on those products. Consumers may assume that all
goods bearing a particular trademark are physically identical,
covered by uniform service warranties or are uniformly backed
by the reputation of the same firm, regardless of who resells or

distributes them. This is not true for gray goods. Most are not
backed by factory authorized service, and, the trademark owners
claim, that gray goods are often different in some physical way
from the products intended for sale in the United States.'
B.

The Law Affecting Gray Goods

U.S. trademark owners have attacked the sale of gray goods
using the law of trademarks, 10 contracts," copyrights,"2 civil
9. Opponents of gray goods argue that some products may not meet American specifications. Cameras may be calibrated metrically or electronic goods may operate only on
foreign voltage. Goods may not have been packaged for international shipment to the
United States. Thus, moisture may lessen the effectiveness of detergents. The shipments,
themselves, are not subject to the quality control of the trademark owner. Beverages may
lose their flavor and batteries their effectiveness. Moreover, some products are simply
made with different ingredients for the foreign markets. For instance, Pepsi-Cola has an
entirely different taste and Procter & Gamble detergent does not have ingredients suited
to the water conditions in this country. Other products may contain ingredients banned
by various agencies in this country for health reasons. Further, gray market watches are
opened and marked to comply with U.S. Customs regulations in non-sterile environments which may impair their performance.
10. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (construing Section 42 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)); International
Armament Corp. v. Matra Manurhin Int'l, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 450 (E.D. Va. 1986) (construing Section 32 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982)).
11. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co.,
798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
12. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors Inc., 569 F. Supp 47 (E.D. Pa.
1983), aff'd mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984) (construing Section 602 of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982)).
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RICO,13 tariffs1 4 and the International Trade Commission.1 5
Each side has had its victories but there has not yet been a decisive battle. While the use of civil RICO has perhaps put the
most scare into those who sell gray goods because of the trebledamage provision, the most important legal battle to date is that
now being waged in the Supreme Court by U.S. trademark owners, the sellers of gray goods and the U.S. Customs Service.
In K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,16 the Supreme Court is being asked to interpret Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 193017
that on its face bans the importation of gray goods without the
consent of the United States trademark owner.18 The United
States Customs Service, however, interprets the Act to allow the
importation of gray goods when the U.S. trademark owner licenses the mark abroad or is part of a multinational company
that does. 19 These have loosely been called "common control"
13. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ["RICO"], 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1982). See Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925 (D.N.J. June 25, 1987)
(available on Westlaw) (order denying motion to dismiss RICO counts) (Sarokin, D.J.).
Cf. United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) (criminal RICO conviction
upheld where defendants through misrepresentations to manufacturers distributed
pharmaceuticals sold for export in domestic market).
14. See, e.g., Premier Dental Products. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d
850, 858 (3d Cir. 1986) (construing Section 526(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §
1526(c) (1982)).
15. See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823 (Int'l Trade Comm. 1984),
disapproved, 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (Jan. 11, 1985), 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862 (1985), appeal
dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm., 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (§ 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
16. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. grantedsub.
noma., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). The Tariff Act of 1930 reenacted the "Genuine
Goods Exclusion Act" which was a part of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, tit. IV, § 526,
42 Stat. 858, 975.
18. There is no contention that the literal language would not allow U.S. trademark
owners to bar gray goods. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 11, K-Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., Nos. 86-495, 86-624 & 86-625 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1987) [hereinafter U.S.
Govt. Brief].
19. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21(a), (b), (c)(1)-(3) (1987):
Restrictions on importation of articles bearing recorded trademarks and
trade names.
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic
manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual
counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to
be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with
the recorded mark or name.
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situations.

U.S. trademark owners in the common control category filed
three separate actions attacking the Customs Service's regulations. The courts of appeals for the Federal Circuit20 and Second

Circuit 21 upheld them; the D.C. Circuit struck them down.2 2

With the Customs Service subject to conflicting rulings, the Supreme Court had no choice but to grant certiorari and did so in
the latter case.23
C. Significance of Supreme Court Decision
For a number of reasons neither Congress nor the Executive
Branch is likely to change the Customs Service regulations
which permit the importation of gray goods, at least not in the
near future.2 4 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, in K-Mart
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation
or association created or organized within the United States are subject to
seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable.The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and the domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or control
(see Section 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
20. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
21. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986), petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3372 (No. 86-757) (Nov. 6, 1986).
22. See Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub noam., K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
23. See id. All parties and intervenors agreed that the Court should grant certiorari.
The respondent, COPIAT, argued that after granting certiorari the Court should summarily affirm without oral argument.
24. Absent Supreme Court intervention, present conditions strongly favor the maintenance of the status quo in which the Customs Service permits the importation of gray
goods. Opponents of gray goods face the institutional inertia of Congress, which exists at
least partly by design. (For instance, the framers of the Constitution intended that both
bicameralism and a small, deliberative Senate would check legislative excesses by slowing
the legislative process and thus providing "stability." See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 63,
at 385 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("necessity of some institution [such as the Senate] that will
blend stability with liberty"). Stability, of course, is another word for the status quo.)
In legal terms this institutional inertia means that there is a de facto presumption in
favor of the status quo. In lay terms one might say that if Congress were a car, it would
not move without a jump start. There are three sources which normally can provide this
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Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,25 has the ability to dramatically affect the
resolution of the gray-goods controversy. It needs only five votes
to strike down the regulations and, thus, effectively to shut
down the gray market. Also, this drastic effect would probably
be the only thing that would move Congress and the Executive,
themselves, to take action on the issue of gray goods.26 Equally
type of start: public pressure, the Executive branch and the courts. The first two in the
case of gray goods are unlikely to spur action.
As for public pressure, most members of Congress have more consumers and retailers of gray goods in their districts than they do "common control" U.S. trademark owners. It is always difficult to justify a vote that will raise prices of consumer goods. It is
especially difficult when the policy that allows the lower-priced goods to be imported and
sold has been in effect for decades and is currently approved by the Administration.
Thus, the lobbying job facing COPIAT, see supra note 7, to overturn the Customs Service regulations through Congress is very difficult, if not impossible. COPIAT's efforts, in
fact, might be reduced to a holding action, i.e., lobbying against bills intending to ratify
and codify the regulations. See S. 1097, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 27, 1987) (introduced by Sen. Chafee and referred to Senate Committee on Finance).
The Administration is also unlikely to spur Congress into action because, as noted, it
presently favors the customs service regulations and is defending them in the Supreme
Court. See U.S. Govt. Brief, supra note 18. The President's Economic Policy Council, in
conjunction with the Department of the Treasury and the Customs Service, did initiate a
review of gray goods in 1984. It has not been concluded, at least officially. See 51 Fed.
Reg. 22005, 30024 (1986); 49 Fed. Reg. 21453, 29509 (1984). After almost four years, this
study has produced only silence which indicates a quiet death may have been prescribed.
(The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, however, most likely does oppose
gray goods. See infra note 52.) As for the courts and their potential impact on Congress,
see infra note 26.
25. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States,
790 F.2d 903, (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. grantedsub nor., K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 107
S. Ct. 642 (1986).
26. An analogous situation occurred with regard to the Betamax case. Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), rev'g, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'g, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Consumers had used video cassette recorders ("VCRs") to tape movies and television programs at home for years. Congress
was content to allow this benefit for consumers at the expense of intellectual property
owners to continue for much the same reasons that Congress is now content to allow
gray-good consumers to benefit at the expense of the U.S. trademark owners. See supra
note 24. When the district court upheld the status quo in its holding that the practice of
"home-taping" did not violate the copyright law, 480 F. Supp. at 469, there was no movement in Congress to address the issue or disturb the status quo. In contrast, Congress
jumped into action after the Ninth Circuit upset the status quo when it reversed the
district court and held that (1) home-taping was a violation of the right to reproduce
under the copyright law, 659 F.2d at 971-72, and (2) that Sony on remand might be
barred from selling VCRs or forced to pay a royalty to copyright owners, id. at 977.
Within days two bills were introduced in Congress. See H.R. 4808, S. 1758, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). Other bills soon followed and hearings were scheduled. (Congressional
inaction is still the favored response, however, and when given an excuse, Congress will
revert to it. Thus, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Betamax, Congress
cancelled the hearings and suspended further action until the Court's resolution of the
issue.) See also infra note 27.
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important, if the Supreme Court reverses the D.C. Circuit and
upholds the regulations, its decision, however narrow, will act to
legitimize the gray market and make its status even more
27
secure.
The legal issues before the Supreme Court are ones of statu-

tory interpretation. Nevertheless, because Congress did not consider the current gray market issues when it enacted and reenacted Section 526, the Court is more likely than usual to allow
its view of the merits to influence its statutory interpretation."
Thus, it becomes important to consider the merits of the graygoods controversy.
27. Again, the Betamax case is analogous. See supra note 26. After the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and restored the status quo, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), Congress lost all interest in the hometaping issue. This was so even though the Supreme Court's opinion was a controversial 54 decision. Moreover, the court had held only that "time-shifting" was a fair use and did
not address the problems associated with the "librarying" of movies and television programs and their effect on copyright owners. Congressional inaction was, and is, in part
due to the fact that in the popular mind, Betamax legitimized all forms of home-taping
including "librarying" from broadcast and cable television. (In fact, under the Court's
opinion such home-taping would probably be illegal.)
Nevertheless, it would be impossible today to move a bill through Congress that
even questioned the legality of any form of home-taping. The constituent would surely
wonder why if the Supreme Court had said the activity was legal, his representative was
trying to prevent him from doing it or to make him pay for the right through royalties on
VCRs or tapes. In short, Supreme Court validation of a consumer benefit, however narrow the holding, comes close to creating a birthright which Congress is unlikely to challenge. The situation would undoubtedly be the same for gray goods and the gray market.
28. Statutory interpretation can be a relatively straightforward exercise. What do
the words of the statute say? If the words are not terms of art, apply them in their
normal meaning. However, statutory interpretation has become much more complicated
than that for a number of reasons. One is that a straightforward analysis sometimes
produces results clearly at odds with the intent of the legislature. Therefore, exceptions
have to be made for "absurd" results.
A more important reason is that some courts have taken on the role of problemsolvers, and have developed rules of statutory interpretation which allow them the flexibility to reach the "correct" result. Sometimes reaching the correct result means a result
at odds with the words of the statute, and sometimes at odds with the intent of the
legislature. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 107
S. Ct. 1442, 1459 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Court's affirmative action ruling at
odds with Court's prior interpretation of statute as well as both language and intent of
Congress).
Thus, in some situations while nominally interpreting a statute, courts have, in effect, displaced the legislature as law makers. In these situations, statutory interpretation
as a process of applying the intent of the legislature is a legal fiction. When Congress has
never considered the specific issue presented on appeal, the Court will undoubtedly feel
even less compelled to take direction from the words of the statute.
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II. UNDERLYING POLICIES OF THE GRAY GOODS CONTROVERSY
U.S. trademark owners and those who sell gray goods are
engaging in a very serious and expensive struggle."9 Which side
is right about gray goods? In considering the gray-goods controversy it is easy to allow emotion and self-interest to cloud the
issue. Desire for lower consumer prices, vague resentment of foreign manufacturers, dislike of brand-name advertising and pro-

motion can and have made this issue more complicated than it

is.3 Resolution of the controversy only requires application of

established antitrust and trademark policies.
A.

Antitrust Policy

From an antitrust perspective the gray-goods controversy is
simply a continuation of the debate over vertical-distribution restrictions.3 1 U.S. trademark owners are seeking to exclude unauthorized imports through Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in
order to protect their exclusive territory, the United States. In
the gray goods context, this becomes a vertical, territorial restriction when the U.S. trademark owners are distributors for
foreign manufacturers.
The Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s followed a
strong populist approach to antitrust.3 2 It sought to prevent any
29. Gray goods litigation is often heated with few settlements. It appears that U.S.
trademark owners, who view those who sell gray goods as pirates, are willing to pay the
costs of litigation both to establish a series of precedents and to increase the cost of
doing business in the gray market. At least some of those who sell in the gray market,
which is estimated at between $6 billion and $10 billion a year, appear to be equally
determined. See supra note 7.
30. With a broad brush, and more than a little touch of xenophobia, K-Mart argues
that the "foreign industries," which have already "destroyed" American competitors, are
now trying to "use the Customs Service to enforce territorial restrictions which are
designed to make American consumers pay higher prices than consumers anywhere else
in the world for foreign merchandise." See Petition of K-Mart for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 16 & n.14, KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., No. 86-495 (Sept. 26, 1986). What "foreign industries"?
Those that manufacture "cameras, watches and consumer electronics." Id. at n. 14. Ah, it
is the Japanese again! This time it is an economic Pearl Harbor. The first wave wiped
out our industry. The second wave is coming in to get the consumers. One can almost
picture the incoming Minoltas at 0300.
31. For a good discussion of gray goods in the vertical-distribution antitrust context,
see Miller, Restricting the Gray Market in Trademarked Goods: Per Se Legality, 76
TRADEMARK REP. 363 (1986). See also, infra note 41.
32. For the Warren Court especially, antitrust was a morality play. There was always a bad guy and a good guy. Bad was large and good was small. This had its roots in
the populist approach to size set forth in BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNss (1934). Be-
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arrangement that limited a small distributor's decision of what
to sell or how much to sell for, even when it hurt consumers."
Exclusive vertical distribution agreements which limit the area a
distributor can sell in and exclude others from distributing the
product at all were an anathema. 4
At the other end of the antitrust-policy spectrum is the socalled Chicago School s5 which rejects all political policy goals including populist. 6 It focuses on consumer welfare which is enhanced by market efficiency. Vertical-distribution restrictions
enhance market efficiency, as long as they are not a cover for
horizontal agreements. Some proponents of the consumer-welfare approach advocate that all vertical restrictions, including
geographic, should be per se legal.37
The Supreme Court today has been greatly influenced by
the Chicago School 38 but is not yet a true believer. It has rejected per se illegality for non-price vertical restrictions while
maintaining it for vertical price restrictions. 39 It adopted a ruleof-reason rather than per se legality approach to non-price verticause the economics and efficiencies of the marketplace are largely irrelevant to populist
concerns, the Court was able to ignore economic theory and to view most issues in terms
of black and white. This led to a series of per se rules throughout antitrust. In short, for
the Warren Court the antitrust laws were not meant to promote competition but to protect and preserve the small competitor.
33. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (newspaper's efforts to
restrain exclusive distributor from overcharging customers per se illegal).
34. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn,
despite the government's rule of reason theory of illegality, the Court adopted a "bright
line" rule of per se illegality for vertical restrictions:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to
seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.
Id. at 379.
35. The so-called Chicago School was "founded" by the University of Chicago Law
School professor Aaron Director who formulated and refined many of the doctrines. His
students, some say disciples, have further developed the school in their writings. The
most prolific of these is Richard Posner, now a U.S. Circuit Judge in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. For Judge Posner's most recent effort in this regard, see
Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. LAW & ECONOMICS
(1987).
36. For the Chicago School, unlike the populist approach, see supra note 32, there is
no good guy or bad guy in antitrust, only the marketplace. There is no "predatory" pricing, only competition. This approach comes close to finding most market practices, other
than horizontal agreements not to compete, to be legal.
37. See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI L. REV. 6 (1981).
38. See Matshushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986).
39. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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cal restrictions. 0

Moreover, in adopting the rule-of-reason approach to nonprice vertical restraints, the Court specifically recognized that
such restraints "promote interbrand competition."41 Interbrand
competition is that competition between brands. Intrabrand
competition is that competition among wholesalers or retailers
of the same brand. The Court correctly noted that interbrand
competition "is the primary concern of the antitrust law."'4 2 It is,

after all, the lack of interbrand competition that leads to substantial market power and, perhaps, monopoly.
The proponents of the gray market argue that limitations
on the importation of gray goods are for the purpose of price-

gouging the American consumer. 43 As the Supreme Court has

recognized, however, the manufacturer generally would prefer
the lowest retail price, once its price to the dealers has been set,
because a lower retail price means higher sales and higher manufacturer revenues.44 Moreover, the U.S. trademark owner who
40. Id.
41. Id. at 54-55. Justice Powell, writing for the court, stated:
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.
These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. Economists have identified a number of
ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers. See, e.g., Preston, Restrictive Distribution
Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 Law &
Contemp Prob 506, 511 (1965). For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and
labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the
consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and repair are vital for
many products, such as automobiles and major household appliances. The
availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and
the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as
the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if none did. (footnote
omitted).
The Department of Justice has also recognized the procompetitive nature of vertical restrictions. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264,
6266 (Feb. 14, 1985).
42. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
43. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
44. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 n.24 (1977). "In
this context, a manufacturer is likely to view the difference between the price at which it
sells to its retailers and their price to the consumer as its 'cost of distribution,' which it
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distributes the product could price-gouge only if it had very substantial market share. Otherwise, interbrand competition would
prevent them from substantially raising prices, let alone gouging.45 Following this reasoning, lower courts under the rule-ofreason approach have found non-price vertical restrictions legal
per se absent market power in the seller. 4" There is no indication that any of the products which are subject to gray-good intrabrand competition are dominant in their respective
would prefer to minimize." Id. See also Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division [II],75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966); Note, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 636, 641 (1975).
The Federal Trade Commission staff in response to Treasury Department request
for comments, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,005 (June 17, 1986), has suggested that a foreign manufacturer might "be forced to price discriminate against U.S. consumers" if it faces contractual (or political) obligations in its home market with respect to price or price and quantity, is producing at capacity, and faces a lag in adding new capacity." See Comments of
the FTC Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection and Economics on Gray Market
Policy Options Facing the United States Customs Service 9 n.11 (Oct. 17, 1986). If this
improbable factual scenario ever did occur, the manufacturer would only be able to effectively price discriminate if all its competitors also faced exactly the same scenario and, as
a result chose to price discriminate. And even if all the competitors were similarly situated, and all were price discriminating, gray goods would still not be the appropriate
answer for the reasons stated below. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
45. The Federal Trade Commission staff has suggested that the imposition of geographic restrictions by manufacturers "might conceivably" stem from the insistence of
colluding retailers or wholesalers who are seeking to raise their profit margins. See Comments of the FTC Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection and Economics on
Gray Market Policy Options Facing the United States Customs Service 12 (Oct. 17,
1986). This scenario is often raised to make a case for restricting vertical restraints. The
collusion in this scenario, is, of course, a per se horizontal price-fixing violation of Section 1 which is subject to criminal prosecution and civil treble damages. (The Antitrust
Division does actively prosecute price-fixing cases.) Considering the severity of the antitrust offense, if this were a probable scenario, by now there should be a body of cases
attacking the practice especially since the chances of such collusion remaining undetected are slim. There is no such body of cases. This is not surprising because the chance
of such collusion working is slim and thus few distributors would be willing to take the
risk even if they were so inclined to violate the law. Moreover, the scenario presupposes
two factors that have not been shown to exist for the products in the gray market: (1)
superior market bargaining power at the authorized distributer level vis a vis the manufacturers; and (2) a relationship among competing U.S. trademark owners that would
take precedence over the trademark owner's relationship to its foreign manufacturer
which is often the parent or a related company.
46. Market power in the seller is defined as the "power to raise prices significantly
above the competitive level without losing all of one's business." Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
Renfield Importers Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982). See also General Leaseways,
Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Assoc., 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Jack Walters &
Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
432 (1984); U.S. Dep't of Just. Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6264, 6268
(1985) (firms with small market shares employing vertical restraints are not subject to
scrutiny by the Antitrust Division).
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markets.47
But even if a product were truly dominant in its market and
its U.S. trademark owner seller was engaged in price-gouging,
gray goods and increased intrabrand competition would still not
be the appropriate answer. The price-gouging of a dominant
firm creates a high profit margin and the incentive for interbrand competitors to come into the market. Intrabrand competition caused by gray goods would reduce the price of the dominant product and, therefore, the likelihood of entry and effective
interbrand competition.
Moreover, the future prospect of intrabrand gray-good competition for the products of the new entrants into the market
would reduce the ability of those firms to seriously compete or
even enter the market at all.48 It can cost up to $30 million to
launch a new product nationwide.49 Without the ability to limit
the "free riding" almost inherent in intrabrand competition and,
thus, recoup this initial cost, there would be few challenges to
dominant firms. One of the goals of a competitive economy is
the production of better mousetraps. These are the result of interbrand not intrabrand competition.5
In short, as two courts of appeals 5' and even the Depart47. In fact, there is vigorous interbrand competition in markets which attract gray
goods such as perfumes, watches, cameras and electronic goods.
48. Even in Schwinn, the Supreme Court recognized that exceptions from the per se
rule against vertical restraints might be appropriate for new entrants into the market.
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967).
49. See Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of a
Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 297, 326 (1982).
50. An example illustrates the difference between the intrabrand (gray-goods) competition and interbrand competition. IBM was once truly dominant in the computer
field. It is highly doubtful that either the consumer, or computer technology, would be
better off today had there been greater price competition among authorized and unauthorized sellers of IBM equipment. Both the consumer and computer technology appear
to be in better positions as a result of the entrance into the market of companies like
Apple Computer which needed for entry, not only high IBM prices, but also vertical
restrictions for its distributors who would then be willing to share the enormous entry
promotion costs.
51. See Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 859
(3d Cir. 1986) (injunction barring importation of gray goods raises "no colorable" antitrust claim). In Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), which
upheld the Customs Service's gray-goods regulations on other grounds, Judge Oakes
stated:
[W]e agree in large part with Judge Leval's statements in [Osawa & Co. v. B &
H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)] that section 133.21(c) is
"unsound both as antitrust policy and as trademark law". . . . [United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. was overruled by Continental TN., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.] and this alone would seem to make reassessment of section

262

BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XIII:2

ment of Justice5 2 have recently concluded, antitrust policy sup-

ports the restricted distribution that comes from barring the importation of gray goods.
B. Trademark Policy
A trademark is a symbol that allows a purchaser to identify
goods or services that have been satisfactory in the past and reject goods or services that have failed to give satisfaction. The
trademark thus serves two goals: (1) the production of quality
products; and (2) the reduction of the consumer's "search
costs."54
By fixing responsibility, a trademark allows the trademark
owner to build good will 5 or, conversely, a bad reputation.
Trademark law encourages the production of quality products
by allowing the trademark owner to reap the benefit of the good
will.
By fixing responsibility, a trademark also reduces the time a
133.21(c) appropriate at least insofar as those regulations rest on antitrust
considerations.
Id. at 319-20.
52. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v.
Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (No. 82-7867). In this brief the Justice
Department urged the Second Circuit to interpret Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930
as the D.C. Circuit later did in COPIAT, that is that Section 526 should be construed "in
accord with the normal meaning of the statutory language." Id. at 9. This construction
would, of course, allow U.S. trademark owners to bar the importation of gray goods.
Significantly, this brief was written by the Antitrust Division in the Justice Department
which obviously found no antitrust problems with the plain meaning of the statute.
This Justice Department amicus brief is not cited by any of the petitioners in K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., including the Justice Department. The change in position is
probably due to the nature of the Justice Department's representation. The Civil Division, not the Antitrust Division, has been in COPIAT from the outset. It is representing
its client, the Customs Service, and is dutifully defending the Customs Service regulations. As an amicus, the Antitrust Division perhaps was more free to take a position
based upon its own policy analysis. Although the U.S. Government now takes an opposite position from that of the Antitrust Division in the amicus brief, it is doing so on a
straight statutory interpretation basis without regard to the underlying policies, including antitrust policy.
53. 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPLrrION § 2:1, at 44 (2d ed. 1984).
54. Id.
55. "Good will may be defined as the favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source." White Tower System
Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937). This includes "public confidence in the quality of the product
and in the warranties made on behalf of the product, and the 'name recognition' of the
product by the public that differentiates that product from others." Premier Dental
Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 n.3 (3d Cir. 1986).
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customer must expend in collecting information about products.

A trademark reduces search time, however, only if the consumer
can expect that products with the same trademark will be the
same. 6
Gray goods do not serve either of these goals. When gray
goods are different from the authorized products,57 they deceive
the consumer and undercut the basic function of trademarks
which is to allow the consumer to know what he or she is getting. Nor does informing the customer on the container or by
notices that the product is a gray good alleviate the problem.
The value of trademarks is greatly diminished, if not destroyed,
if the consumer must read the fine print at every purchase. Con.sumer faith in consistent quality is essential to the functioning
of trademarks. Gray goods that are different seriously erode this
faith.
Gray goods that are different from the authorized product
also sabotage the good will the U.S. trademark owner has established. When the importer knows that the gray good is different
from the authorized product, it is essentially committing the basic unfair competition tort of passing off that has been condemned for hundreds of years.
Even when gray goods are identical to the authorized good,
they still undermine trademark principles. This is because one
purpose of trademark law, regardless of public confusion, is to
prevent others from exploiting a trademark owner's hard-earned
good will.5 8 This type of protection, which is also a basis of mis56. Cf. Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 384 (5th
Cir. 1984):
"By ensuring correct information in the marketplace the [trademark] laws reduce
losses caused by misunderstanding and deceit and thus permit consumers and merchants
to maximize their own welfare confident that the information presented is truthful." Id.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Model Rectifier Corp. v.
Takachiho Int'l Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502, 503 (9th Cir. 1983) (missing and broken
parts); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (different and sometimes offensive subject matter in Canadian gray market Trivial Pursuit);
Weil Ceramics & Class, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985) (different warranties); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no
warranty).
58. This purpose was made clear in the legislative history of the Lanham Act 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 219 (1945) (accompanying H.R. 1654):
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is two fold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product it asks for
and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
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appropriation law, 9 derives from the dislike of the "free rider,"

an "economic parasite who must be enjoinable by the law." 0
In short, the Customs Service regulations which allow the
importation of gray goods are "unsound" as trademark policy.6

III.

CONCLUSION

There is no question that gray goods can lead to lower
prices and greater availability of quality brand-name items. For
some, that appears to be enough to place them in favor of gray
goods.62 Yet, even assuming that lower prices and greater availability are always desirable, 3 the question remains whether the
means used to achieve those ends are appropriate.
For instance, the same results, lower prices and greater
in his investment from its misappropriationby pirates and cheats. This is the
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark
owner.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added) (quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Trademark Ass'n, K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., Nos. 86-495, 86-625 (U.S. Sup. Ct. May 7,
1987) p. 8 [hereinafter U.S.T.A. Brief].
This aspect of trademark law rarely gets explicit recognition in the case law. That it
is a remaining, if often unstated, purpose is illustrated by the emblem cases. See e.g.,
Boston Pro Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products,
Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982). But see
International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918-19 (9th
Cir. 1980).
59. See, e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
60. 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1, at 47 (2d ed. 1984).
The principle of "territoriality" establishes that there may be good will in the United
States trademark owner separate and apart from that of the manufacturer. For an excellent discussion of territoriality and good will and their relation to gray goods, see Osawa
& Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also U.S.T.A.
Brief supra note 58, at 7.
61. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986).
62. See, e.g., Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416,
421 (S.D. Fla. 1983):
[T]here is adequate evidence that the public has the benefit of lower prices in
that those products offered by the John Doe Defendants are usually less expensive than those sold by Plaintiff through its authorized distributors. Therefore, it appears that the Court would be doing the public a disservice by
preventing the dissemination of what appears to the Court, uncontroverted, to
be equally good, yet less expensive, legitimate Oscar de la Renta fragrance
products.
Id.
63. They are not always desirable. Lower prices caused by intrabrand competition
can reduce interbrand competition. Lack of control over retail distribution can hurt the
proper promotion of the product as well as jeopardize safety and quality control. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977).
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availability, are also achieved when a truck carrying trademarked goods is hijacked and the goods sold to consumers on
the streets, and sometimes in the stores. No one would or should
approve of stealing goods even if the lower price benefits or
pleases the consumer.
The gray market exists because in essence it hijacks the
good will and promotional efforts of the U.S. trademark owners.
Good will is a form of property." Yet because it is intangible
property, its taking is harder to detect. If good will were tangible
property, the gray market would be seen more clearly for what it
is, a version of the black market.6 5
Our laws with regard to trademarks and commerce should
provide incentives for those who create and produce. They
should seek to prevent consumer confusion. And they should enforce basic notions of commercial morality. Support for gray
goods accomplishes none of these goals. Such support merely favors those who reap what others sow.

64. See, e.g., 1 J. MCCARTHY,

TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 2.8 at 75 (2d

ed. 1984).

65. In one sense, the gray market is even worse than the black market because at
least in the black market the products are identical. Because of physical differences or
differences in warranties of gray goods, the gray market undercuts the basic trademark
principle that trademarks allow a buyer to know what he or she is getting.

